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COMMENTS
CON STITTmONAL LAw-EIMvLEIS A wAwnST SLF-INCYRIrNATION-
REQUwMSINT OF WARNING TO WITNESS T=IFYIG EFORE
GRAND JURY
Um7'et States r. Scadly, 225 FX2 11$ d (M '. i195Q
When, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury which was inves-
tigating alleged fraud, defendant was not advised of the privilege
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment He was in-
dicted and subsequently convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United
StaUs Defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that
the failure to warn constituted a denial of the privilege against self-
iecrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirned
th, order of the trial court denying the motion to quash, holding hat
the mere possibility that an ordinar witness may subsequently be
indicted by a grand jury does not require that he be advised of his
right to invoke the privilege when testif ng before that grand jury.'
An accused- who is called as a witness before a grand jury or other
prehminary investigating body to give testimony in regard to mat-
ter as to which he has ah-eady been charged, has a privilege to refuse
to take the stand.5 The ordinary witness, however, is afforded merely
thw right to refuse to answer specific questionsa, the answer to which
might tend to indicate that he is guilty of a crime,5 and he can con-
stitutionalty be compelled to take the stand.4 While an acused is
entitled to a warning of his right to refuse to take the stand, it has
, U aited States v. Scully, 25 F2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert &ad, 850 U.S. 897
( I1#I.
2 A r, accUsed is one against whom a formal charge has been even made
hy nditmntinormation, or complaint before a nmgsr Virginia v. Paul
t4$ US, 107, 119..21 (1893). In the principal case defendant did not come within
t his definitionl,
i, 22 (i k see UNoIRM RuLls or E v mvN rule 23(4).
4, NMcComwcK, EflDENC § 122 (1I54).
5Mat§ 12$ (1to4>
i; n ited States v. Iatte; 79 .24 127 (3d Gin IM)$; United Sates v. Pe
t0 in 2 52,1 (2d Cir. I93); O'Conell v United Stes, 40 Frd 20I (2d
7 ULnited States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp, 674, 077-7$ (SD.N.Y 195). The dis.
aintin beheen the rights of an accused and the rigt of a mer witness was
made mn the earner cases of United States v Wetmoe, 218 Fed. 277 (W. Pa
19141 and United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed, 156 (S.U.N.Y. 1902) It was rea-
sened that the fifth amendment guaranteed an ordinaw witness the to
W answer spVecifie questions, the answers to, which would tend to
after he was worn as a witness at a trial, Wt that the scope of the cottutio
pirvilege did not extend to accused pares nimi tial snc they were
cmpeteent as witne at common law The p ae of nlr an at-lse t dnt onlyif, h chose to do so (see, .g., 8 U.&? 38 (1552dlid net automatically remoe hi Incompetency, hut merel gaehm th power to
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generally been stated, as in the principal case, that where an- ordinary
witness is called to testify, no warning of his privilege to refuse to
answer specific questions is required.8
While the question in the principal case is presented in terms of
whether there existed a duty to warn defendant of his privilege to re-
fuse to answer, it would appear that such an issue involves merely a
specific element of a broader problem, i.e., whether, by reason of the
fact that a witness is compelled to take the stand without having been
warned, he has been compelled to testify against himself in violation
of the privilege.
This postulate is supported by the fact that among the cases gener-
ally cited in support of the rule that it is unnecessary to warn ordi-
nary witnesses, can be found cases which are phrased in terms of
compulsion, rather than of warning.9 In Powers v. United Stateseo
and in Wilson v. United States," the Supreme Court was concerned
with whether certain confessions were admissible in evidence. In both
cases it was determined that it was not essential to show that the
confessing party had been warned that his statements could be used
against him, so long as it appeared that the confessions were freely
and voluntarily made, and that there were no outwvard manifestations
of compulsion.'12
If a witness can prove that he was ignorant of the privilege against
self-incrimination, and that he would have invoked it had he had
remove this incompetency by offering himself as a witness. It was said that since
an accused could not be compelled to take the stand in a criminal trial, he could
not be compelled to appear before any other body unless the statutory immunity
was waived. The more recent cases have stated that an accused waives his privi-
lege to refuse to take the stand only after having been informed of his privilege
and then having chosen to take the stand. Thus, the scope of the requirement that
a warning be given of the existence of the privilege has been extended from oper-
ation in a formal criminal trial so as to include other proceedings, such as those
of a grand jury. United States v. Lawn, supra; United States v. Benjamin, 120
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Miller, 80 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
Unlike the earlier cases recognizing that the privilege of an accused to refuse
to take the stand had to come from the statute removing his incompetency, and
not from the Constitution, the later cases have confused the two privileges. But
see McCoRIcK, EVIDENCE § 122 (1954) (legislative privilege assimilated to
constitutional privilege).
8. United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1937); Pulford v. United
States, 155 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1946) (dictum); United States v. Hirsch, 74 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1934) (dictum); Thompson v. United States, 10 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.
1926) (dictum). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2269 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912); Wilson v. United States,
162 U.S. 613 (1896); Knoell v. United States, 239 Fed. 16 (3d Cir. 1917) (Since
defendants appearing as witnesses were represented by counsel and did not claim
the privilege, there was no compulsion.); United States v. Wetmore, 218 Fed. 227(W.D. Pa. 1914); United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1902) (Since
defendants did not show any signs of unwillingness and were represented by
counsel, there was no compulsion.). In none of the above cases was there stated
a rule that no warning was needed.
10. 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
11. 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
12. 223 U.S. at 313-14; 162 U.S. at 623-24.
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knowledge, it has been held that a warning is necessary in order that
any possibility of compulsion may be obviated. Thus, in Belt Iv. United
States,' defendant, when testifying as an ordinary witness at a prior
trial, was not advised that he could refuse to give self-incriminating
testimony. Since it appeared that he was unaware of the privilege
against self-incrimination, the court felt that there was a strong like-
lihood of compulsion. The court considered compulsion not only as
a matter of actual physical coercion, but also as a state of mind, the
existence of which might not be indicated by outward manifestations.
The Bell case, however, does not require a warning in all cases, but
merely establishes that is it necessary to warn a witness where there
might otherwise be compulsion. Hence, Bell is not inconsistent with
those cases which have declined to reverse convictions because of a
failure to warn inasmuch as the latter involve situations where each
appeal was based upon allegations asserting merely the failure to
warn-not upon allegations or offer of proof that the witness was
actually ignorant of his rights under the privilege, or that he would
have refused to testify had he known of his rights.u'
In some of the cases holding that a warning is unnecessary, the ac-
cused persons who appeared as witnesses before grand juries had con-
sulted counsel, were acting under the advice of counsel, or were them-
selves lawyers? Wie it thus was apparent that none of these wit-
nesses were ignorant of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
privilege was not invoked by any of them. The feeling is expressed
in the opinions that the witnesses had testified before the grand juries
in attempting to create favorable impressions, and having failed to do
so, were, as an afterthought, seeking to quash the indictments by al-
leging violations of the privilege because they had not been warned.r
These cases clearly would not qualify under the rule in the Bell case,
13. 81 Fed. 830 (W.D. Tenn. 1897).
14, See, (o.g., Powers v. United States and Wilson v. United States, s!WV note
9. Cf. United States v. Kimball, supra note 7, where it was stated that it is not a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination to compel a witness to take
the stand unless there are outward manifestations of an unwillingness to answer
specific questions, It was further stated that the question of what procedure
should be employed where the witness is ignorant of the privilege was not before
the court,
1o. Thompson v. United States 10 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1926; United States v.
Haas, 126 F. Sup. 817 (S.D.N.V. 1954); United States v. Klein, 124 F. Supp,
476 (S.D.N.Y. 19 4).
16. Ibid. That a similar attitude of the courts exists where the incriminating
testimony was given at a prior criminal trial, is indicated by Block v. United
States, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1937). In that case defendant, while testifying as
an ordinary witness at a prior trial, had given self-incriminating testimony in
portions of his answers which were beyond the scope of the questions. The courtheld that a warning was not essential since the test of whether a witness has been
denied the privilege against self-incrimination Is whether the testimony was
freely given, all things considered
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but rather would seem to fall within the purview of the Powers and
Wilson cases, n6 warning being required.
In the principal case it did not appear that defendant was ignorant
of his rights or that he would have testified differently had he been
warned of the privilege.1 He had not been denied opportunity to con-
sult counsel, and had asserted his complete innocence of any wrong-
doing."8 Therefore, defendant in the principal case failed to meet the
test of Bell, but rather fell within that line of cases generally cited for
the rule that no warning is necessary. 9
Despite the implications of the Powers and Wilson cases, 20 there
is much to be said for a general warning requirement whereby all
witnesses, before taking the stand, would be advised of the constitu-
tional privilege to refuse to answer incriminating questions. 21 Such
a rule would insure that all witnesses had knowledge of the privilege,
and that* constitutional rights would not be lost by reason of igno-
rance 2 Not even a general warning requirement, however, would fully
effectuate the policy of the amendment because the lay witness would
often fail to recognize the incriminating quality of a certain fact in
a circumstantial chain.2 3 Although convictions would be reversed
even when the witness had actual knowledge of the privilege in those
instances where no warning was given, such a rule would seem to be
preferable to a rule which would possibly deny the benefit of the con-
stitutional privilege because of the failure to bear the presently re-
quired burden of proof.24 It seems unfair to require a person to prove
that he is ignorant of a constitutional privilege to which he is ad-
mitted initially to be entitled, and to further require him to offer spec-
ulative proof of the nature of what his actions would have been had he
not been ignorant.
17. 225 F.2d at 114.
18. Id. at 114 n.1.
19. See notes 8 & 9 supra.
20. In the principal case Judge Frank's concurring opinion describes the
Powers and Wilson cases as "virtual rulings" that it is unnecessary to warn any
witness other than an accused. Id. at 119.
21. The concurring opinion of Judge Frank in the principal case proposes
that any witness should be warned of the privilege by a federal prosecutor if a
question calls for an incriminating answer. Id. at 120.
22. It has been stated that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
extend to one who is ignorant of his rights-the privilege must be claimed. United
States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (dictum); United States v.
Bryant, 245 Fed. 682 (N.D. Tex. 1917) (dictum). But see discussion of Bell v.
United States in text supported by note 13 supra.
23. McCoRMcK, EvmEcN § 130 (1954).
24. See text supported by note 14 supra.
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